I think we can all agree that the middle of last September was
as strange a time as our financial markets have ever
experienced.
In case you’ve forgotten, let me remind you with a simple
timeline. As you read it, keep in mind that following the demise of
Bear Stearns, the strictest interpretation of the so-called
investment bank “Bulge Bracket” included just four
entities: Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Morgan
Stanley.
- September 9: The short attack on Lehman
Brothers begins in earnest.
- September 14: The New York Times reports
Lehman will file bankruptcy.
- September 15: Goldman Sachs share price begins
to wilt. Merrill Lynch announces it will be sold to Bank of
America.
- September 17: Goldman Sachs’ share price
continues to plummet. The SEC announces “new rules to
protect investors against naked short selling
abuses”.
- September 18: Goldman Sachs’ share price
continues to plummet.
- September 19: The SEC “halts short
selling of financial stocks to protect investors and
markets”. Goldman Sachs’ share price posts a
strong gain.
- September 22: Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley, the two remaining members of the “Bulge
Bracket” announce their intentions to transition to bank
holding companies, giving them access to lending facilities of the
US Federal Reserve (an organization with which Goldman has an
uncommonly tight relationship).
As I see it, the most interesting event to come of that most
eventful period was the SEC’s September 19 ban on legitimate
short selling. What makes it so enigmatic is the fact that not even
the most vocal opponents of illegal naked short selling have ever
even hinted at the need to restrict legitimate shorting. In fact,
Patrick Byrne himself compared the ban to limiting motorists to
making only right-hand turns.
However, I have a theory that might explain what was going
on.
An examination of the volume of both naked and legitimate
shorting of Goldman Sachs in September of 2008 reveals something
very interesting: while there was an enormous amount of short
selling taking place, there was essentially no naked shorting of
Goldman shares. Indeed, short selling accounted for a third of
total volume on September 15 and 16, while failed trades accounted
for less than 0.07%, suggesting shortable Goldman shares were in
abundant supply.
This conclusion is supported by an analysis of the stock loan
rebate rate that prevailed for Goldman shares during the period in
question: a very reliable indicator of the scarcity of shares
available for short sellers to borrow, where a lower rebate rate
indicates a more limited supply.
In the case of Goldman, from May through August 29 of 2008, the
rebate rate averaged 1.80%. And, between September 1st and the
September 19th short selling ban, Goldman’s average rebate
rate remained exactly the same: 1.80%.
By way of comparison, the average rebate rates for Lehman
Brothers shares over the same periods were 1.18% and 0.16%
(bottoming out at -0.25% during Lehman’s last week),
respectively.
By contrast, Goldman shares appear to have been easy to borrow
right up to and in the midst of its stock price free-fall.
This scenario is consistent with the levels of naked short
selling of Lehman and Goldman during the same period: extremely
high in the case of Lehman, and almost non-existent in the case of
Goldman; furthermore, this suggests that, given abusive naked
shorting does not tend to occur until after short sellers have
exhausted the supply of borrowable shares, it was legitimate
shorting that pushed Goldman’s share price over the edge.
With that in mind, let’s revisit the above timeline,
focusing on Goldman, with my interpretation appended.
- September 15: Lehman declares bankruptcy.
Goldman Sachs share price begins to fall. Following the destruction
of Lehman Brothers at the hands of short selling hedge funds, the
financial world is keenly aware of the capacity of naked shorting
to decimate the share prices of financial firms. Furthermore, given
the role Goldman undoubtedly played as broker in the criminal short
selling hedge funds’ attack Lehman, the firm is justifiably
concerned that the karma train is heading its way.
- September 16: Goldman lobbies its extremely
well-placed (and
well-documented) federal government contacts for a temporary
ban on naked short selling.
- September 17: The SEC temporarily bans naked
short selling.
- September 18: Despite the ban on naked
shorting, Goldman Sachs’ share price continues to fall,
suggesting legitimate short selling, not illegal naked short
selling, is the cause of Goldman’s problems. Goldman lobbies
for the SEC to temporarily ban legitimate shorting.
- September 19: The SEC temporarily bans
legitimate shorting of all financial stocks. Goldman’s share
price rises.
Might the SEC have been acting in the best interest of the
market when it issued both emergency orders? I suppose that’s
possible. But given the utter disinterest – even contempt
– that organization has demonstrated toward investors and
small public companies that have complained about the issue, I find
it very difficult to believe.
Meanwhile, the SEC stood by and watched as naked short selling
destroyed Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Merrill Lynch then took
itself out of the game, leaving a Bulge Bracket consisting of only
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.
Of those two, which has uncommon influence over the federal
government?
Goldman Sachs, of course.
And if this is true, does it leave any doubt as to the lengths
the SEC might have gone to preserve a corrupt system when it
benefited the company?