And so it was with today’s second and concluding session
of the SEC’s roundtable on securities lending and short
selling: I
expected the absolute worst, but in the end was pleasantly
surprised to find that it wasn’t quite as bad as I
feared.
That’s not the same as proclaiming it a good thing,
because it was not. Indeed, I stick by yesterday’s
characterization of the event as farce with a pre-determined
outcome.
Having said that, I was deeply impressed by two surprises I
clearly had not anticipated. And I’ll get to those in a
moment.
But first, an overview.
There were two panels. The first examined proposed pre-borrow
and hard locate requirements — keys to closing two of the
most dangerous remaining loopholes in the US stock settlement
system. The second panel examined proposals requiring enhanced
disclosure of short selling data — a good idea but ultimately
one that would be much less necessary were the proposals discussed
in the first panel enacted.
I’ll start with the second panel, which surprised me by
coming down overwhelmingly in favor of more transparency in short
selling.
Georgetown University Professor James Angel pointed out that
greater disclosure would essentially be doing legitimate short
sellers a favor, by vindicating them in cases when they are
incorrectly accused of manipulation in response to stocks dropping
in value.
David Carruthers, of short selling analytics firm Data
Explorers, supported greater transparency in short selling where
the goal was to “prevent market abuse and prevent the
development of a false market, or to prevent situations where
market participants take advantage of a vulnerable
company.”
Richard Gates, founder of short selling hedge fund TFS Capital,
denied that shorting exacerbated the onset of the current financial
crisis, but went on to concede that there should be greater
disclosure parity on the short and long sides of market
activity.
Michael Gitlin of investment manager T. Rowe Price echoed the
position of Professor Angel in saying real time reporting of short
versus long sales would result in the “demystification of
short selling,” adding, “The ongoing debate of what
caused an individual security to decline would largely disappear
with this added level of transparency.”
As the lone issuer represented on the panel, Jesse Greene, Vice
President of Financial Management at IBM, was enthusiastically in
favor of a general overhaul of the SEC’s short selling
regulatory framework, including public disclosure of short
positions, in order to “improve market stability and restore
investor confidence.”
Joseph Mecane, Executive VP at NYSE, noted that market
fragmentation has made it more difficult to detect manipulation,
requiring regulators have access to more short selling data in
order to better conduct market surveillance.
In other words, the second panel was a slam dunk in the right
direction.
The first and ultimately more meaningful panel, on the other
hand, was the Yin to the second panel’s Yang.
Appropriately enough, Managing Director of the Equities Division
at Goldman Sachs William Conley kicked things off, lamenting that
“both the pre-borrow and hard locate requirement would
require significant infrastructure builds on the part of the
industry as well as its participants.”
By “infrastructure builds”, Conley is referring to
the development of new software able to track down real shares for
short sellers to borrow. He seems to have forgotten three
things:
- When there’s money to be made, Goldman Sachs has a rare
talent for developing extremely complicated software. Could it be
that Conley never met former co-worker
Sergey Aleynikov?
- LocateStock.com, then a bootstrapping startup, developed
software that accomplishes precisely the same task Conley regards
as so burdensome, on a shoestring budget.
- If Goldman Sachs has enough cash on hand to spend nearly
$12-billion in employee bonuses this year, it can probably set
a couple hundred thousand aside to write some crumby software.
As I predicted yesterday, much of the balance of Conley’s
mic time was spent echoing the anti-reform
talking points currently being circulated on Capitol Hill by
his employer’s army of lobbyists — in some cases,
verbatim.
William Hodash, Managing Director at DTCC, took us on a trip to
his organization’s mindset circa 2005 by pointing out that
fails to deliver are not necessarily evidence of naked short
selling. With one foot remaining firmly in 2005, another in 2009
and a third in a pile of his own illogic, Hodash then said that the
reduction in fails observed before and after the SEC’s
implementation of Rule 204 “may be relevant to the discussion
of whether naked short selling remains a problem.”
No, you didn’t miss anything. That’s what he said,
with all remaining panelists basically pleading some variation of
the on his and Conley’s approaches.
With one very prominent exception: Dennis Nixon, Chairman of
International BancShares Corporation (IBC).
Looking at the program, I had assumed that IBC’s role on
the panel was that of a broker or other market intermediary. Well I
was very wrong. IBC was there in the role of an issuer targeted by
naked short sellers, and Nixon very poignantly expressed the
anguish of someone in his position, after a 45-day long bear raid
removed $1.2-billion in IBC shareholder value.
“And I think it was all attributed to this predator-type
short selling that goes on in this market today that’s
uncontrolled. It’s unbelievable,” Nixon said.
That was the first surprise.
The second surprise came from an even less likely source:
Commissioner
Elisse Walter.
Mostly silent throughout the previous day’s panels, today
Walter made it clear that she’s not buying the excuses
offered by industry representatives insisting this problem is too
much for them to tackle.
“I’m sort of surprised that the industry
hasn’t come up with a solution, particularly as this
controversy has continued to swirl and does not go away,”
Walter said, adding that by failing to address the issue, the
industry is essentially passing the cost of non-compliance on to
the SEC’s own Division of Enforcement.
I think she’d make a stronger case had the Enforcement
Division brought more than two cases against naked short sellers in
its entire history, but that’s a topic for another post.
The bottom line is, this panel was undeniably stacked against
any additional meaningful steps to limit illegal naked short
selling, but the contributions of Dennis Nixon and Elisse Walter
were as welcomed as they were unanticipated.
The entire affair could have been much better, but also could
have been much worse.
Judd Bagley is a writer for Deep Capture reporting from
Washington D.C.